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DYNAMIC CO-EXISTENCE OF COMPANY-OWNED AND
FRANCHISED OUTLETS WITHIN A COMPANY: A
FRAMEWORK OF THE FRANCHISOR'S PERSPECTIVE
BOONGHEE YOO, Hofstra University
ROBERT E. SIBLEY, San Jose Stat~ U!li~e~i~
Why and how do company-owned and franchised outlets simultaneously exist within the same
organization? The purpose of this article is to integrate a variety of theories on this interesting
retailphenomenon into a broader theoreticalframework based on thepolitical-economy paradigm.
This paper attempts to integrate the perspectives of several theories that previously have been
considered competing models of a single reality-the access-to-capital viewpoint, transaction cost
analysis, the population ecology perspective, and power-dependence-conflict arguments-into a
broader perspective that utilizes intra-firm factors and the internal and external economies and
polities of the political-economy paradigm. A model depicting this integration is set forth and
nineteen research propositions stemmingfrom this model are proposed

INTRODUCTION

entities-in capital, labor, and product markets. For
example,the franchisor developsa product or service
Franchise systems are an important channel form, to sell to franchisees. The hierarchy-like features
accounting for about 40 percent of all retail sales in stem from the quasi-vertical integration found
the UnitedStates(InternationalFranchise Association, betweenthese two entities. For example,a franchisor
2002). Scholars have been curious about why firms provides substantial operational support to the
choosefranchisingversus company-<>wned
outlets and franchisee and the franchisee conforms to the
Thus, franchise
why, in many cases, a dual system of operation (i.e., franchisor's provisions.
both franchised and company-owned outlets) has organizations are neither totally independent
evolved. The presence of both market-like and operations (market) nor completely vertically
hierarchy-like features in franchise organizations has integrated ones {hierarchy). While transaction cost
attracted significant attention from researchers analysis (TCA) theory posits an intermediate point
(Anderson 1984, Bradach and Eccles 1989, Brickley (i.e., hybrids) between markets and hierarchies
and Dark 1987, Brickley, Dark and Weisbach 1991, (Williamson1985,1991), BradachandEccles(l989)
Carney and Gedajlovic 1991, Dant, Kaufmann, maintain that franchise systems operate in plural
Paswan 1992, Martin 1988, Norton 1988a, 1988b, forms using both market and hierarchy governance
Osborn and Hagedoorn 1997, Thompson 1992, structures simultaneously to perform the same
Williamson 1991).
function. They argue that this provides unique
synergisticbenefitsand, thus, shouldbe distinguished
Market-like transactions take place between from the TCA typology of market and hierarchy
franchisors and franchisees-two
independent governance structures.
The Marketing Management Journal
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Association

Among the theoretical reasons for firms' selections of
franchising are: (1) the ease of raising capital (Caves
and Murphy 1976, Hunt 1973, Oxenfeldt and Kelly
1969); (2) risk-sharing with franchisors, as well as
Marketing Management Journal, Fall 2002
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infonnation advantages explained by agency theory for charting-out a demonstration of the complex
(Brickley and Dark 1987, Brickley, Combs and interrelations of relevant theories. He writes:
Ketchen 1999, Dark and Weisbach 1991, Carney and
First, while I firmly believe that
Gedajlovic 1991, Jensen and Meckling 1976,
viewing marketing channels as
LaFontaine 1992, Mathewson and Winter 1985,
political economies is appropriate
Norton 1988a, 1988b, Thompson 1992); (3)
and helpful, the political-economy
economizing on transaction and governance costs
perspective merely provides a
(Dahlstrom and Nygaad 1999, Klein 1980,
framework. It is not a theory, and
Williamson 1985, 1991); (4) different level of
makes no pretense to being one. Its
responsiveness to competition and environmental
primary message is that, in order to
changes as interpreted by the population ecology
understand and map channel
viewpoint (Pilling, Henson and Yoo 1995, Yoo,
interactions,
economic and
Donthu and Pilling 1998); and (5) power and conflict
behavioral
variables
must be
dynamics as found in socio-psychologicaltheories.
webbed in some holistic manner.
To advance knowledge in this area,
We argue that, giventhe complexityof the franchising
theories must be brought to the
phenomenon, no one perspective is superior to the
framework, and the most fertile
others because the perspectives do not compete with
ground
for those theories is
each other to provide exclusive and exhaustive
probably in the basic disciplines
alternative explanations. By investigating different
(Stem 1988, p.2).
aspects of the same realitythrough differentvariables,
each of the theories contributes to an overall
THE FRAMEWORK
understanding of the factors that allow the co
existence of (as well as shifts between) companyowned outlets and franchisees within the same Previous research on franchising phenomena within
organization. The purpose of this article is to the fields of marketing, economics, finance, law,
integrate these five theories into a framework of organization and socio-psychology literature, has
broadenedperspectivebased on the political-economy guided us in constructing this comprehensive
taxonomy (cf. laId 1970, Stem and Reve 1980, Arndt conceptualization of franchising versus ownership
1983). In particular, this paper attempts to describe choice. The framework defines the channel dyad of
and explain the internal/external economy/polity of a franchisor and its franchisee as the fundamental
why and how company-ownedand franchised outlets unit of analysis because transactions betweenthe two
co-exist simultaneouslywithin the same organization. actors are very important to the inter-organizational
study of marketing channels. However, our model is
primarily
focused on the franchisor's perspective
The developedconceptual framework is based on the
since
it
is
franchisors that determine whether a
political-economy paradigm, which proposes a
balanced presentation of internal and external factors company's retail outlets will be company-owned,
on the inter-organizationalrelations of a channeldyad franchised, or both.
(see Achrol, Reve and Stem 1983, Arndt 1983,
Dahlstrom and Dwyer 1992, Dwyer and Oh 1987, Focusing on inter-firm relations, the classic politicalDwyer and Welsh 1985, Reve and Stem 1985, Stem economy framework omits intra-firm phenomena that
and Reve 1980, laId 1970). The political-economy are antecedents of and ongoing influences on interframework for comparative analysis of marketing firm relations. Our model attempts to capture intra
channels insists that internal and external economic firm characteristics and dynamics. Thus, the intra
and sociopolitical forces should not be analyzed. firm factors of both franchisors and franchisees and
Stem (1988) recommendspolitica1-economyanalysis the internal and external forces in economic and
not as a theory itself, but as a foundation for theory sociopolitical areas that all affect the dyad are unified
building in marketing channels and as the proper aid in one model.
Marketing Management Journal, Fan 2002
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The political-economy approach perceives an
organization to be sets of important economic and
sociopolitical factors that interact to influence
collectivebehavior and performance (Stem and Reve
1980).
Economy/polity and intemallexternal
dimensions are considered central in a politicaleconomy framework (Arndt 1983, Stem and Reve
1980, Zald 1970). Polity refers to "the power-and
control systems of a social unit (e.g., an organization),
a network of social units or a society." Economy is
"the productive exchange system of a social unit or
society transforming inputs to outputs."
The
internal/external dimension consists of "the external
(environmental)versus internal (organizational)polity
and economy" (Arndt 1983, p. 48). Consequently,
this study's framework has four categories: (1) the
internaleconomy,i.e., "the internal economicstructure
and processes," (2) the internal polity, i.e., "the
internalsociopoliticalstructure and processes," (3) the
external economy,i.e., "the nature of its vertical (input
and output) and horizontal markets," and (4) the
external polity, i.e., "the distribution and use ofpower
resources among external actors." These four
categories interact and influence each other, and it is
these interactionsthat this study will explore.
INTRA-FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
AND DYNAMICS

Yoo and Sibley
relations with its partner). Basically, the politicaleconomy approach assumes an on-going relationship
between two parties in perpetuity even though the
content of the relationship differs due to internal and
external forces. Therefore, we need to look at intra
firm factors to more comprehensively understand the
interactions between two parties.

The analysis of intra-firm characteristics and
dynamics which impact on inter-firm relations of the
dyad is drawn largely from TCA (Williamson 1985)
and agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983). TCA
posits that the efficacy of channel arrangements is
achieved by economizingor minimizing transaction
costs, that is, "the costs of running the economic
system" (Arrow 1969, p. 48), which are determined
by such transactional attributes as transactional
frequency, asset specificity and uncertainty
(Williamson 1985). However, transaction costs
shouldbe weightedagainst correspondingproduction
costs at a given form of organization since
transaction
cost economizing should not
underestimate "first-order economizing--effective
adaptation and elimination of waste" (Williamson
1991). In other words, transaction costs should be
considered together with production costs to
minimizetotal cost.

TCA maintains that "transactions, which differ in
Intra-firm factors deal with production, transaction, their attributes, are aligned with governance
and agency costs for each memberof the dyad. Major structures, which differ in their cost and
intra-factors of the franchisor are the franchisor's competencies" (Williamson 1991, p. 277). Here,
capital needs and agency costs. Major intra-factors of human aspects cannot be ignored, and it has been
the franchisee are the franchisee's relative postulated that "human agents are given to
performance and the relative salvage value of a opportunism, which is a condition of self-interest
franchise.
seeking with guile" (Williamson 1985, p. 30). For
example, in a transaction with high specific
As mentioned above, due to its emphasis on inter- investments,vertical integrationis less costly than an
organizational relations, the traditional political- arms-length market transaction (Bradach and Eccles
economy paradigm allows no room for intra-firm 1989).
factors which playa critical role in inter-firm
relations, as marketing scholars have long contended Like TCA, agency theory concentrates on the
(see Arndt 1983, Stem and Reve 1980). Ignoring principal-agent relationship (i.e., in this context,
intra-firm factors can make it difficult to apply the franchisor-franchiseeor franchisor as an employerof
political-economy framework to research on employee-managers) and considers characteristics
determinants of economic structure (e.g., what and behaviors of both a principal and its agent
determines a company's preference of vertical (Bergen, Dutta and Walker 1992, Fama and Jensen
integration or makes the company decide to terminate 1983). Agencytheory considers the pertinent agency
25
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costs as a major determinant of organizational form.
As Fama and Jensen (1983) maintain, "An
organizational form survives in an activity when the
costs and benefits of its residual claims and
approaches it provides in controllingagencyproblems
combinewith availableproductiontechnologyto allow
the organization to deliver products at lower prices
than other organizational forms" (p. 333).
Franchisor's Intra-Firm Factors
Franchisor's Capital Needs

Yoo and Sibley
agency costs are too expensive, the organization must
change its organizational form. Agency costs are a
function of agents' opportunism, which assumes that
agents will act in their own best interests if given the
chance (Williamson 1985). However, Bradach and
Eccles (1989) maintain that, where opportunism
might be reasonably anticipated, trust predominates
(e.g., in franchising arrangements) because it
promises reciprocal benefits to both parties to a
principal-agent relationship.
Lafontaine (1992) found that, instead of the
franchisor's need for capital, a more significant
explanation for firms choosing to franchise is that
both the agent (franchisee) and the principal
(franchisor) prefer franchising because of its ability
to reduce or prevent moral hazard on both sides.
Under this view, there really are incentive issues for
franchisors and franchisees. Within an organization
the co-existence of franchisees and company-owned
outlets gives the franchisor inter-firm and intra-firm
control mechanisms since a franchised or companyrun outlet risks ownership change whenever its
agency costs become too high (Bradach and Eccles
1989, Combs and Ketchen 1999). Thus:

The capital-raising argument views franchising as a
source of capital for small business expansion. In
this way, the franchisor can raise capital less
expensively than using other plans (Caves and
Murphy 1976). Thus, franchisees are considered an
economicalsource of expansioncapital. Accordingto
this idea, small companies with limited access to
capital markets use franchising to expand their
business. Later as the companymatures and no longer
has the same expansionary capital needs, the owners
buy back the most profitable units. Thus, it is
expected that successful franchise systems will tend
toward perfect companyownership(Hunt 1973,Lillis,
Narayana and Gilman 1976, Oxenfeldt and Kelly Proposition 3.
Company ownership decreases
1969, Zeller, Achabal and Brown 1980). when the cost of monitoring employee-managers
mcreases
Consequently:
Proposition 1. As potentialfranchisors require more Proposition 4.
Company ownership decreases
capital they more likely choose franchising.
when the level of non-repeat customers decreases
Proposition 2. As potential franchisors require more
capital they more likely increase economic incentives
(e.g., lower up-front and royalty fees) to encourage
rapid investment decisions by franchisee prospects to
speed up cash inflows.

Proposition 5.
Company ownership decreases
when the investment needed to start a new unit
decreases.

Franchisor's Agency Costs

Relative Performance of a Franchisee

Franchisee's Intra-Firm Factors

Agency costs are "the costs of aligningthe incentives A franchisee's relative performance is measured by
of principals and agents, including bonding and comparing a franchisee's performance to the
monitoring and related forgone output attributable to performance that can be achieved if the franchisee is
those activities" (Fama and Jensen 1983). A replaced by a corresponding company-owned outlet.
franchisor will compare agency costs between its two From the franchisor's perspective, the expected and
possible types of agents, employee-managers and actual performances of the franchisee greatly
franchisees, and will select the less-costly type. If influence the franchisor's decision to franchise.
Marketing Management Journal, Fall 2002
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Here, effectiveness, efficiency, and adaptability are the
measurements of performance (Ruekert, Walker and
Roering 1985). Effectiveness is defined as the extent
to which organizational goals are reached (Parsons
1992) and can be operationalized as market share, net
income, or sales. Efficiency concerns the allocation of
resources among alternative uses and often measures
the degree to which the minimum possible input is
used to capture a given output, or the degree to which
the maximum possible output is acquired from a given
input (see Donthu and Yoo 1998, Yoo, Donthu and
Pilling 1998). Efficiency can be measured as the ratio
of multiple inputs to multiple outputs. Adaptability or
responsiveness is defined as the speed with which a
company responds to changing competition and
environments (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1989), as
measured by the population ecology model (see
Pilling, Henson and Yoo 1995).

Research has shown franchisees are superior to
company outlets mainly for two reasons. First,
because franchisees have more entrepreneurial
ambition to generate profits than the managers of
company-ownedoutlets do, they often achieve better
performance (Norton 1988a, 1988b, Rubin 1978,
Shelton 1967, Wattel 1968). Second, a franchisee
investor enters a franchise system only when there is
a high probability of profitability. Research indicates
that a high gross margin is a franchisee's primary
consideration (Burton, Cross and Rhodes 2000,
Weinrauch 1986),followedby training or know-how,
greater independence, and the presence of an
established trademark (Bradach and Eccles 1989,
Peterson and Dant 1990). Therefore:

roo and Sibley
investment to enter that franchise system. The
franchisee cannot avoid the required initial
investment to enter a franchise system. As the
investment increases, the relative salvage value
decreases. In franchising contexts, the investment
tends to be highly non-salvageable;for example, one
cannot easily sell the big arch of the golden letter
"M" at a McDonald's. Such unrecoverable and
transaction-specific investments, termed by
Williamson (1985) as specific or dedicated assets,
include site specificity, physical asset specificity,
human-asset specificity, brand name capital,
dedicated assets, and temporal specificity
(Williamson 1991). If the contract law is unfair to
the franchisee,then the franchisee's non-redeployable
transaction-specificassets will encountermore severe
"lock-in effects, on which account autonomous
trading will be commonly supplanted by unified
ownership (vertical integration)" (Williamson 1985,
p.53).
This works as a self-enforcingmechanism (Wathne
and Heide 2000). However, the franchisee's vertical
integration cannot be developed until the contract
with its franchisor is terminated; without the
franchisor's trademark, the franchisee cannot enjoy
any benefits from the relationship since its
performance is based on high interdependencywith
its franchisor. Nevertheless, a franchisor may not be
willing to wait to terminate the franchise contract
until the salvage value is low, which makes
continuing the relationship too expensive for the
franchisor. Caves and Murphy (1976) posit that a
franchisor tends to repurchase its franchise if
potential returns from changing company ownership
exceedthe costs of repurchasingthe franchise. Thus:

Proposition 6. As a franchisee outperforms an
average company-owned outlet, the franchisor will
open a new franchised outlet or continuethe on-going Proposition 7. As the reacquisition cost of the
relationshipwith the current franchiseeto improvethe franchise decreases, ownership redirection from
franchisor's financing bases, capabilities, and franchisee to franchisor increases.
creditworthiness.
THE INTERNAL ECONOMY
Relative Salvage Value of a Franchisee

The franchisee's relative salvage value is the
differencebetween the "cash-out" sellingprice of the
franchised outlet and the franchisee's initial
27

This category is divided into two subgroups--internal
economic structure and processes. The internal
economic structure refers to "a type of transactional
form linking channel members (e.g., vertical
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integration versus market)" (Stem and Reve 1980, p.
54) ranging from independent agencies to integrated
hierarchies. The internal economic processes refer to
"the nature of the decision mechanisms employed to
determine the terms of trade among the members"
(Stem and Reve 1980, p. 54). At the intra-firm level,
a franchise company can select one of three
transactional forms that correspond to Williamson's
(1985, 1991) hierarchies, markets, and hybrids
respectively: entirely company-owned outlets, entirely
franchised outlets, and a mixture of both. In terms of
the internal economic structure of a franchisorfranchisee channel dyad, however, a franchisor can
move between continuity and termination of a
franchising relationship as a strategic move between
hierarchy and market.
Decision-making may be probabilistic, depending on
many other inter-organizational and environmental
forces, even though there are only two levels of
organization in a franchising dyad. The probability of
franchising leads us to predict the opening of a new
location for a franchised or company-owned outlet,
termination of a franchising contract with the current
franchisee, or replacement of one organizational form
(franchised or company-owned) with the other. At the
firm level, this probability can be transformed into the
proportion of franchised outlets to the total number of
outlets in a franchise system.

Even though bureaucracy issues such as
centralization,
formalization,
specialization/
differentiation or complexity, and participation in
decision making have greatly affected the internal
economicstructure (Arndt 1983, Dwyer and Oh 1988,
Ruekert, Walker and Roofing 1985, Stem and Reve
1980), it is noteworthy that they show significant
differences only when different forms of organization
are compared. Thus, bureaucracy is important
betweendifferent organizationalforms, not within the
same organizational form (see Dwyer and Oh 1988).
From the franchisor's perspective, if a companyowned unit is compared to a franchised one, the
franchised unit will show lower centralization, higher
formalization, and higher participation in decision
making since basically the latter is less integratedwith
the franchisor than the former.

Marketing Management Journal, Fall 2002
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Internal economicprocesses are driving forces in the
economic exchange decisions between the members
of the channel dyad. Some examples are allocation
rules and incentive systems (Arndt 1983, Zald 1970).
These decision mechanisms are constrained by the
internal structure (Stem and Reve 1980). In the
franchising context, the mechanisms are an
agreement between the franchisor and franchisee on
royalty fees, sales-reporting, improving the value of
the trademark, and other services and obligations.

Economic Rules and Incentives for a Franchisee
The allocation rules refer to accounting and
budgeting information, as well as to decision
instruments developed to ensure compliance with
decisions and to promote efficiency (Arndt 1983).
Examples in franchising are royalty fees and sales
report agreements. Incentive allocations are defined
as "the distribution of rewards and sanctions to
motivate role performance" (Zald 1970, p. 251).
These systems contain monetary/non-monetaryand
contractual/non-contractual incentives to bond the
target firm to the source firm and make the source
firm more dependenton the target firm. A franchisor
can offer various incentivessuch as market surveys,
site selection assistance, store design and
improvement, management training programs,
operating manuals, equipment packages, regular
operating assistance, coop-ad, and promotion(Knight
1986). In short:
Proposition 8. When a franchisee is offered more
favorable economic rules and higher economic
incentives, it performs better.
THE INTERNAL POLITY
Like internal economy, this category is divided into
two subgroups: the internal sociopolitical structure
and the internal sociopolitical processes. Internal
sociopolitical structure refers to "the pattern of
power-dependence relations which exist among
channel members" (Stem and Reve 1980, p. 54) that
"identify an individual's position in a hierarchy"
(Dahlstrom and Dwyer 1992, p. 48). Internal
sociopolitical processes refer to "the dominant
28
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sentiments (e.g., cooperation and/or conflict) within
the channel" (Stem and Reve 1980, p. 54).
In general, polity is viewed as "the allocation and use
of authority and power within the system" (Stem and
Reve 1980, p. 57, also see Emerson 1962). In the
framework of this research, the internal sociopolitical
structure consists of: (1) a franchisor's dependence on
its franchisee, (2) the franchisee's power over the
franchisor, and (3) the franchisor's coercive power
over the franchisee.
The internal sociopolitical
processes consist of: (1) the unfairness of the
contractual agreement, (2) conflict, (3) cooperation,
and (4) competition within the same franchise system.
Williamson (1984) said, "credible commitments and
credible threats...appear mainly in conjunction with
irreversible, specialized investments" (p. 33). A
franchisor may be tempted to be opportunistic since a
franchisee invests significant unrecoverable assets that
become hostages to the franchisor's orders and the
franchisee's performance is one-sidedly interpreted by
the franchisor. Among typical opportunistic behaviors
of the franchisor are agreement renewal refusal
hazards, underestimation of the franchisee's specific
investment, and incomplete or maladaptive contracts
which are open to contingencies during contract
execution (see Williamson 1984).

Contractual Agreement Unfairness

roo and Sibley

In this study, the franchise relationship resemblesan
employer-employee contract--the implicit contract
law ofintemal organization (Norton 1988a, 1988b,
Williamson 1985). An unfair contract between a
franchisor and its franchisee can be measured in
compariso1'lto the contract among the companyowned outlets on the same issues (Bradach and
Eccles 1989). The two contracts can be compared
because a franchisor utilizes two different control
mechanismsto accomplishthe samefunction. Unfair
and incomplete franchise laws favorable to
franchisors are conventionalsincefranchisors tend to
apply the forbearance doctrine (Hadfield 1990).
However, Williamson (1985) suggests relational
contracting or bilateral governance where a
contractual market relationship remains steady since
the transactions in franchising are frequent and
dictated by transaction-specific investments.
Heide (1992) also predicts bilateral governance for
franchise-like relationships, where "the parties jointly
develop policies directed toward the achievement of
common goals" (p. 10). Both parties benefit from
maintaining the relationship because they can avoid
the loss of investments and jeopardy to the reputation
of the trademark.
The norms of obligation and
cooperation suggest shared values exist between the
two parties (Bradach and Eccles 1989, Heide and
John 1992, Kaufinann and Stem 1988). In the
franchising context, these norms include decreased
risk of free-riding, increased goal congruence, and the
development of common beliefs and values. In
summary:

The primary reason that franchise systems are not
somewhere on the continuum of the market and
hierarchy dichotomy is that they operate under a
distinctive type of contract law (Williamson 1985,
1991). A franchisee has greater autonomy than in a Proposition 9. An unbalanced or unfair power
hierarchy but must follow more rules and undergo scheme allows the franchisor to exercise coercive
more surveillance than a market. The franchisor power over the franchisee, leading to a lower degree
exercisessignificantlymore power over the franchisee of cooperation.
through one-sided contract termination and
performance supervision (Klein 1980, Preble and Cooperation
Hoffman 1999, Williamson 1984). The ability of the
franchisor to unilaterally terminate a franchise is Some researchers have conceptualized cooperation as
essential to the franchise ownership choice (Dant, inversely related to conflict, that is, as one of the two
Kaufinann and Paswan 1992). In general, the ends of the cooperation-conflict continuum; others
franchisor always has a greater initiative of contract have thought of cooperation and conflict as different
termination since it can arbitrarily evaluate the concepts (e.g., Anderson and Narus 1990, Gaski
1984). In this framework, cooperation is treated
performance and behavior of its franchisee.
29
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separately from conflict since it is postulated that
lower levels of cooperation precede conflict.
Anderson and Narus (1990) define cooperation as
"similar or complementarycoordinated actions taken
by firms in interdependent relationships to achieve
mutual outcomes or singular outcomes with expected
reciprocation over time" (p. 45). They found that
cooperation is positively affected by communication
and outcomes in comparison with alternatives, and
favorably affects both trust and evaluations of recent
efforts to solve disagreements (Anderson and Narus
1990). Consequently:
Proposition 10. An increase in the cooperative
behavior of a franchisee leads to a decrease in conflict
with its franchisor.
Franchisor's Dependence on the Franchisee

Yoo and Sibley

1990, Zeller, Achabal and Brown 1980). The rivalry
becomes severe if the available resources (e.g.,
potential buyers) are not sufficient for the members
of the franchise system to meet their growth targets
(Schmidt and Kochan 1972). Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978) postulate three types of rivalry: (1) a
competitiverivalry (essentiallya zero sum game; the
outcome of one party can be higher only if the
outcome for the other is lower); (2) a symbiotic
rivalry (where both parties become worse off or
better off at the same time); and (3) an asymmetric
rivalry (that is, a mixture of competitive and
symbiotic rivalries) (p. 41).
Franchisor-franchiseerivalry, which emerges due to
the dual distribution channel of company-ownedand
franchised outlets in the same market, eradicates the
synergies of franchising set forth by Bradach and
Eccles (1989) and Jensen (1989), and requires
modificationof the organizationalstructure toward a
stable dual distribution system (Dant, Kaufinann and
Paswan 1992).
Given the extent of goal
incompatibility and resource scarcity, failure to
address this type of rivalry can develop into terminal
conflict (Schmidt and Kochan 1972). The rivalry
might be accelerated when consumers do not
differentiatebetweencompany-ownedand franchised
outlets (see Williamson 1984). For example,
consumers do not know--or care--whether the
McDonald's they patronize is franchised or
company-owned. Thus, any marketing effort to
regain consumers' loyalties is ineffective and the
franchisee may be tempted to violate the relationship
with its franchisor to secure positive profits.

Frazier (1984) maintains, "the performance of the
source's firm on elementsof its channel role or its role
performance, its perceivedability to carry out inherent
responsibilities, will largely determine the target's
need to maintain their exchange relationship" (p. 70).
Thus, when the franchisor favorably perceives the
franchisee's role performance, its dependenceon the
franchisee will increase. Keith, Jackson and Crosby
(1990) found that coercive influence strategies (e.g.,
punishments) are more effective than non-coercive
ones (e.g., reward, expert, referent, and legitimate
strategies) since they can be targeted to both an
individual channel member and to an individual
behavior or performance (Etgar 1978). The more
dependentchannel member tends to obey its partner's
request and such obedienceis contradictoryto the use
of coercive power. Thus:
Firms that share the same trademark, whether
franchised or company-owned,should be considered
Proposition 11. A franchisor that is more dependent the same organization within the same system since,
on its franchisee will be less likely to use coercive in the public's perception, they compete with
influence strategies against that franchisee.
independent outlets, other company-owned chains,
and other franchise systems rather than with each
Competition within the Same Franchise System
other (Pilling, Henson and Yoo 1995). Under such
conditions, the franchisee will expect to be charged
If the number of franchisees in a specific geographic
less for royalties. Usually, the royalty fee is fixed as
area within the same franchise system is large, then a percentage of a franchisee's sales, so the
inter-franchise rivalry increases (Dant and Gundlach
franchisor's net income fluctuates directly with the
1999, Ghosh and Craig 1991, Kaufinann and Rangan
franchisee performance. However, when two
Marketing Management Journal, Fall 2002

30

Dynamic Co-existence of Company-owned.

....

Yoo and Sibley

Sibley (1985) operationalizedthe coercive sources of
a franchisor's power as "the likelihood of the
franchisorpunishingthe franchiseethroughthe use of
specific business activities" (p. 196). These sources
are the effect of potential ex post franchisor
opportunism on contract design in franchising
relationships. A franchisor tends to include very
Proposition 12. Higher levels of competition within opportunistic coercive powers in ex ante contracts to
the same franchise system reduces the franchisee's deal with eventualities such as uncertain demand or
more attractive alternative investment opportunities
perfonnance.
(Dewatripont and Sekkat 1991). If a franchisor
Franchisee's Power over the Franchisor
interferes with the franchisee's activities through
coercive power, then conflict between the parties of
the
channel dyad will increase (Schmidt and Kochan
The franchisee's power can be defined as the
franchisee's ability to pressure the franchisor. 1972). Williamson (1984) said that credible threats
Decreased franchise profitability due to increased appear in the context of conflict and rivalry.
rivalry makes the franchisee dissatisfied with its Research has consistently found that execution of
relationship with the franchisor. To secure the coercive power increases conflict while the use of
profitability expected when the contract was written, non-coercive power does not (Brown and Frazier
the franchisee will likely complain and request lower 1978, Lusch 1976, Wilkinson 1981). Thus:
royalty fees or relocation of neighboring companyowned units. Also, the franchisee will resist any Proposition 14. If coercive power is exercised, then
attempts by the franchisor to expand the number of the franchisee's satisfaction decreases.
units in a given market (Zeller, Achabal and Brown
1980). Even though a franchisee has firm-like Conflict
features, the franchisee becomes a stronger residual
claimant against the franchisor than the franchisor's Here, conflict refers to the franchisor's conflict,
employee-managerssincethe franchiseehas paid both which is not necessarily equal to the franchisee's
an explicit up-front franchisee fee as ex ante bondage conflict(Gaski 1984). Essentialto conflictresolution
and on-going royalty fees as ex post bondage (Norton procedures is whether or not continuing the
1988a, 1988b). Therefore, the franchisor is relationship with the partner yields benefits in excess
responsible for the franchisee's minimal profits. of costs (Pondy 1967). This crucial question must be
However, if the franchisor perceives the franchisee's resolved in the affirmative before deciding which
request as reflective of incompatible role demands or strategy to use (see Dant and Schul 1992). If the
expectations, then the franchisor's conflict level will benefits exceed the costs, the efforts to resolve the
conflict will help continue the relationship. A wise
increase (Pondy 1967). Consequently:
egoistic firm will collaborate if continuous
transactions
offer benefits that surpass the financial
Proposition 13. A franchisee's power over its
and non-financial costs it will incur by exiting the
franchisor increases conflict with the franchisor.
relationship. Otherwise, the conflict will push the
parties toward termination of the relationship. At
Franchisor's Coercive Power
this time, the franchisor may decide to extend its
Coercive power sources are punishments or threats monopoly power in a given market by reacquiring
such as delivery delay, charging higher royalty fees, some or all of the franchised outlets. This decision
taking legal action, and--particularly in franchising- always presents a trade-off between the costs of
the threat of franchise termination (see Hunt and managing the conflict with the franchisees and the
Nevin 1974, Lusch and Brown 1982). Michie and
companies with the same trademark are located in
close proximity,perfonnance can be a product of their
rivalry as they compete and interfere with each other
(Dant and Gundlach 1999, Ghosh and Craig 1991,
Kaufinann and Rangan 1990, Zeller, Achabal and
Brown 1980). Thus:
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agency costs of the company-ownedunits' managers
(see Zeller, Achaba1and Brown 1980). In summary:

interconnectedness via common input/output
linkages,environmentalconflictand interdependence
(Achrol and Stem 1988).

Proposition 15. If the benefits exceed the costs, the
franchisor will continue the relationship with its
franchisee despite conflict.

External Economy
Market Maturity

ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS
This environmental force has been explained by a life
This category consists of external economic/ cycle theory (Oxenfeldt and Kelly 1969). Life cycle
sociopolitical structure/processes. The external theory views franchising as a transitory phenomenon
economyis definedas "the nature of its vertical (input and predicts that once a mature stage is reached,
and output) and horizontal markets" and the external most successful franchise systems will develop into
polity is defined as "the distribution and use of power large company -owned chains. Only poor-performing,
resources among external actors" (Stem and Reve marginal sites are expected to be run by franchisees
1980, p. 54). Achrol, Reve and Stem (1983) propose since their low profitability will make company buythe environmentalpluralism of channel dyads where backs uneconomical. Franchising is more popular in
the primary task environment (i.e., immediate a premature stage of the industry because a firm can
suppliers and customers), the secondary task grow rapidly and a significant part of the expanding
environment(i.e.,suppliersto the immediatesuppliers, firm's adjustment cost is the value of lost current
customers to the immediate customers, regulatory production associated with selecting and training new
agents and interest aggregators, and direct and managers (Faith, Higgins and Tollison 1984). Ifless
potential competitors to the channel dyad), and the capable new managers are recruited, such poor
macro environment (i.e., general social, economic, employee/task matches lead to higher production
political, and technological forces) are delineated (p. costs. Thus, according to Carney and Gredaj10vic
57). Additionally, the two task environments are (1991), rapidly expanding firms will adopt a
dividedinto the input sector (i.e., all direct and indirect franchise system because the competent and
suppliers to the dyad), the output sector (i.e., all direct motivated agents needed by these rapidly growing
and indirect customers of the dyad, both distributors firms would demand franchisee status (i.e., they
and end users), the competitivesector (i.e., actual and would demand quasi-ownership, not employee,
potential competitors of the channel dyad), and the status). In summary, franchisees are a useful means
regulatory sector (i.e., regulatory groups) (Achro1, for rapidly establishing a competent presence in the
Reve and Stem 1983). Following Arndt (1983), this market (Cavaliere and Swerdlow 1988). Thus:

paper directly considers other related environmental
forces, to wit: (1) market maturity; (2) market density; Proposition 16. As the market matures, the
(3) competition within industry; and (4) government franchisor increases the proportion of companyowned outlets.
regulation fairness.
The environmentis definedas "a phenomenonenacted
by the organizational decision makers within it"
(Achrol and Stem 1988, p. 47). This environmentof
the channel dyad affects the dyad's structure and
performance. In particular, the degree of decisionmaking uncertainty experienced by channel members
is influenced by diversity among individual
consumers, dynamism, concentration, and capacity
rather than diversityamong organizationalcustomers,
Marketing Management Journal, Fall 2002

Market Density

Market density is an industry's penetration of the
target market and is measured by the number of
establishments of an industry per capita in the
market. Agency theory predicts that greater
geographical dispersion causes more monitoring
problems for the firm (Brickley and Dark 1987,
Norton 1988a, 1988b). First,managersofcompany
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owned outlets may shirk their duties because their
supervisors are out of sight. Second, greater
dispersionof sites impliesmore supervisors and higher
monitoring costs since more time is lost moving
between sites. Therefore, it is expected that remote
locations will be serviced by franchised units and
geographically concentrated locations will be served
by company outlets (Norton 1988a, 1988b).
Similarly, company ownership is associated with
urbanizationandhigherpopulationdensity(Thompson
1992). Ifbrand name capital exists, a firm's physical
dispersion amplifies the franchisor's vulnerability to
quality debasingby a local outlet (Klein 1980). Thus,
using local owner-managers, who make heavy sitespecific investmentsand post a large bond in the form
of a franchisee fee, reduces the likelihoodof quality
debasing, because a franchisee has much more to lose
upon termination than a local employee-manager
(Norton 1988a, 1988b). Consequently:
Proposition 17. When market density increases, the
franchisor increases the proportion of company-owned
outlets.
Competition Within Industry
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External Polity
Government Regulation Fairness

The more uncertainty there is in the regulatory
environment, the more opportunity there is for
unfairness in the contractual agreement (Achrol,
Reve and Stem 1983). Government plays an
important role in preventingfranchisors from taking
advantage of durable, immovable investments of all
kinds (Williamson 1991). Therefore:
Proposition 19. Higher levels of government
regulation reduce unfairness in the franchise
contractual agreement.
CONCL USION AND IMPLICATIONS

This research suggests a framework of the
franchisor's perspective on the decision to use
franchised outlets, company-ownedoutlets, or both.
Our framework harmoniously integrates within a
political-economy model several paradigms--the
access-to-capitalviewpoint,transaction cost analysis,
population ecology perspective, and power
dependence-conflictarguments.

Achrol, Reve and Stem (1983) posit that lateral
competitiveuncertainties may lead to less conflict and The political-economyparadigm has proven useful in
more cooperation within the channel dyad. introducing and classifying multiple theories in an
Competitive threats make the channel dyad more ordered way (Stem 1988). By adding intra-firm
cooperative because such threats are perceived as factors which act as antecedents to inter-firm
aggressive moves against the dyad from a common relations, the current research suggests a remedy to
enemy. Therefore, it is expected that "the higher the two of the weaknesses of the political-economy
uncertainty in the competitive sector of the task model: (1) the framework has only inter-firm
environmentof marketingchannel dyads, the higher is variables, in which the antecedents of the interthe level of cooperation within the dyad" (Achrol, organizational relations cannot be identified and (2)
it shows no finite or foreseeabletermination points to
Reve and Stem 1983, p. 64). In short:
a relationship.
Proposition 18. As industry competitionincreases,the
cooperation between franchisor and franchisee Despite the popular and traditional capital-raising
mcreases.
explanation for franchise organizations, this
explanation has suffered from criticisms. First,
franchising is not limited to small companies with
restricted access to capital markets. There are a
number of large companies that have sufficient
access to capital markets, yet still choose to
franchise. Second,there has been no direct empirical
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evidenceregardingthe hypothesisthat franchisors will
increasecompanyoperation as they mature and obtain
better access to capital (Caves and Murphy 1976,
Martin 1988). Third, franchisors commonly supply
financingto their franchisees. Thus, such franchisors
do not use franchising as a source of capital. Fourth,
from a portfolio view of finance, franchising is a more
expensive way of capital raising compared to public
equity and debt claims or selling shares of the
franchisor-owned units to their employees (Rubin
1978). This is true when a risk-reluctant franchisee
requires a high return on its investment because its
investment in a single outlet is riskier than that in a
portfolio of shares from all outlets in a chain (Rubin
1978). In summary,the capital-raising explanation is
not supported in a perfect capital market, which
provides cheaper capital financing than does
franchising. That is why this theory is called a
capital-market imperfectionexplanation.

Yoo and Sibley

operating efficiency, employee productivity, and
stockholder value, and thus franchising remains a
comparatively efficient source of capital over time
(Jensen 1989). Bradach and Eccles (1989) view
franchising as the best among Williamson's (1985,
1991) three types of organizational forms because a
franchise system benefits both sides of a franchisorfranchisee relationship such as risk diversification,
rapid local market penetration, flexible and quick
responsiveness to changing circumstances, and
economiesof scale.

While previous theories tend to concentrate on a
dyadic decisionmechanismwithin the same franchise
system (i.e., one franchisor and its franchisees) and
ignore the influences by other competitive. and
environmental factors, the population ecology
paradigm considers other competitors outside
franchise systems (i.e., independentunits) but in the
same industry and environments in which the units
Despite such criticism, redirection theory--that as a operate (see Lambkin and Day 1989, Pilling,Henson
franchise becomes successful, franchisors repurchase and Yoo 1995). Therefore, population ecology
the most profitable franchises-has been conceptually makes it possible to see the dynamics of the
and empirically supported (Anderson 1984, Dant, organization from the political-economicperspective
Kaufinann and Paswan 1992, Hunt 1973, Lillis, of the interactions of the channel dyad and its
Narayana and Gilman 1976, Oxenfe1dt and Kelly environment (Arndt 1983, Achrol, Reve and Stern
1968). Hunt's (1973) survey showed that, as the 1983).
percentage of company-owned establishments
increased, franchisors' hoped to own an even larger If the perception has been communicated that the
percentage of establishments in the future. Lillis, franchisor's power is overwhelming, that perception
Narayana and Gilman's (1976) survey of fast food might be misleading. A franchisee commonly has the
franchises found that the benefits of rapid market right to sell its business to a third party before the
penetration promoted franchising but that fully franchisor buys it back. Actually, the sale of an
integrated direct distribution became more popular as existing franchise by the franchisee is common. This
the franchise matured. Anderson (1984) and Dant, occurs partly because of age, economic or lifestyle
Kaufinann and Paswan (1992) posited that powerful considerations and partly because of actions
franchisors expand their ownership shares by buying responding to the threats and "unfair" behaviors of
back the most successful franchised outlets.
the franchisor. Moreover, even in the event of a buy
On the other hand, franchising does not appear to be
a transitory stage on the way to complete ownership
integration, which is predicted by capital-raising and
franchisor's life cycle explanations. The conflict
between owners and managers over the control and
use of corporate resources breaks down the wholly
company-owned operation without franchising (Jensen
1989). Franchising provides remarkable benefits in
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back, the franchisor cannot coerce the franchisee into
selling at 1ess-than-market prices. Indeed, many
franchisors have paid premiums to buy back strong
franchisee operations.

Both of the parties have the means, symmetric or
asymmetric, to destroy each other. While in an
extreme situation a franchisor has the ability to
refuse to renew the franchise agreement, its
34
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franchisee can defraud it by underreporting its sales,
corrupting the trademark, and neglecting required
goals such as sales penetration. Heide and John
(1988) hold that a finn with high transaction-specific
investments offsets these investments by attempting to
increase the substitutability of the assets. Therefore,
we need to look at the interdependence of the dyad,
which "exists whenever one actor does not entirely
control all the conditions necessary for the
achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome
desired from the action" (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978,
p.40).

Future research is required to (1) investigate a
franchisee's perspective of franchising versus
independentownership, (2) connectthe franchisor and
franchisee perspectives, and (3) test and improve the
conceptual frameworks through empirical research.
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